HMA in the

GRAY ZONE
by Lt. Col. Shawn Kadlec [ 20th CBRNE Command ]
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ow do the military, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector cooperate with each other when they find
themselves conducting mine action tasks typically considered
the purview of each other’s sectors?
As demonstrated in Iraq and elsewhere, armed conflicts
rarely end in immediate peace. More broadly, conflict does
not only concern direct violence between adversaries. It may
involve anything from nonviolent forms of influence (i.e., soft
power) to the use of proxy states or nonstate actors, who wage
war against each other on behalf of other states (e.g., American
and Russian use of proxy forces in Syria). These realities mean
humanitarian mine action (HMA) programs will increasingly
take place in a gray zone—that space between armed conflict
and peace, in which military and civilian agencies must operate simultaneously.
In response to the complexity of an operational environment without clearly demarcated states of peace and war, the
United States Department of Defense (DoD) conceived what it
calls the competition continuum; first put forward in the Joint
Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) and then further
developed in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19. In turn, the U.S.
Army continues to refine Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
as the future operating concept for employing its capabilities
across the competition continuum, to support U.S. national
security policy and goals. The HMA community, along with
the broader stability and development communities, should
understand these concepts and ideas, because the “competition” in the gray zone is not about delineating military and
civilian roles. Rather, it is about military and civilian organizations finding appropriate circumstances in which to best employ their capabilities or to defer to others’ capabilities when
needed. It behooves the international HMA community—
military, government, NGO, and private sector—to develop
methods of cooperation and collaboration that apply across
the competition continuum. Despite recognizing the need
for better civil-military integration, the DoD has not codified
a doctrinal concept or idea for how to effectively collaborate
with other government agencies, NGOs, or the private sector.

However, the private sector and academics have created many
models of partnership and collaboration continuums that can
serve as an intellectual foundation for developing complimentary efforts between civilian and military organizations.
We should look to them as a starting point to improve grayzone cooperation in circumstances that force the military into
overlapping its traditional mission space with those of other
HMA operators.
According to editors of The Journal of Conventional
Weapons Destruction, “[t]he existential differences between conflict and post-conflict are becoming increasingly
blurred.”1 The U.S. DoD has defined this space as “competition below armed conflict.” It may involve anything from nonviolent forms of influence (e.g., cyberattacks, economic sanctions, security assistance, etc.) to the use of proxy states or
nonstate actors, who wage war against each other on behalf of
other states. The situation in Mosul, Iraq, exemplifies a gray
zone: though the Iraqi military retook Mosul, nonstate actors
continued attacking the city with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and conventional munitions.2 Syria provides an
even more complex example of a gray zone. Within the broader Syrian conflict, the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Iran
are using proxy forces to advance their national interests in
the region and disrupt their adversaries’ interests.3 As a result,
there are limited military forces from these countries operating in Syria, certainly not enough to establish security and
to begin stability operations akin to post-war efforts in Iraq
or Afghanistan.4 These circumstances, highlighted by a lack
of armed conflict between national militaries, pose “jurisdictional” challenges to military forces, government agencies,
and the civilian sector.
Such gray zones, in “limbo” between peace and armed conflict (or, “large-scale ground combat operations” in current
U.S. Army parlance), are just enough at peace to dispatch nonmilitary HMA operations into them. However, there is still
just enough war to keep military forces deployed in them as
well. This may trigger an overlap among military forces and
civilian aid organizations conducting mine action (or other
stability operations) in the gray zone.
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Figure 1. Depiction of the competition continuum and examples of friendly and adversary activities along the continuum. The black
boxes enclose military objectives along the continuum.
Figure courtesy of Stephen Marr, Nicholas Hargreaves-Heald, Hiram Reynolds, and Hannah Smith. 5

To better address different sectors’ overlapping efforts in that
middle ground between war and peace, it is useful to examine
the DoD’s JCIC, which describes the gray zone as comprising a
“competition continuum – a flexible spectrum of strategic relations that range from cooperation to competition below armed
conflict to armed conflict itself.”5 The U.S. Joint Staff’s JDN
1-19 further describes the competition continuum as “enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation,
competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.”6
The competition continuum does not replace the artificial
peace/war dichotomy of the past with an artificial trichotomy;
nor does it envision distinct transition points between cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. Rather, it seeks to
describe an environment in which the United States may simultaneously cooperate and compete with other international actors. For example, the United States cooperates with
China on anti-piracy operations while competing with China
regarding freedom of navigation.6 Similarly, the DoD could
find itself conducting HMA activities in cooperation with adversarial states, or as a competitive response to counter adversary influence in a country or region important to United
States interests. Among competitors with the United States,

6

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

China has a growing HMA program and international outreach (e.g., China recently donated mine-clearing equipment
to Cambodia).7 In response, the United States could refocus or increase spending on military and civilian HMA programs as part of a larger national and international strategy
to promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as an alternative to
China’s Belt-Road Initiative.8 While the civilian HMA community already operates alongside military forces, competition below armed conflict will intensify the geopolitical role
of HMA and of other facets of stability operations.
JDN 1-19 also provides a lexicon that defines the geopolitical goals and strategic objectives of military activities along
the competition continuum. The three broad ideas of competition—armed conflict, competition below armed conflict,
and cooperation—also contain a range of military objectives, which should mirror country-specific policy goals and
whole-of-government efforts (see Figure 1). Importantly, JDN
1-19 uses the DoD’s Law of War manual, which is based on national and international law, as a basis for defining the various forms of armed conflict and lethal activities that span the
continuum.6 Competition below armed conflict and cooperation apply to the civilian-HMA community because this is
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Figure 2. The linear battlefield is typically associated with large-scale ground-combat operations (e.g., World War
II).12 Using World War II as a hypothetical example, HMA activities could have taken place throughout France,
Belgium, etc. as the Close and Deep Maneuver Areas progressed into Germany.
Figure adapted from The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028.13

where the lines between military and civilian HMA tasks blur
in post-conflict and geopolitically contentious environments.
These DoD terms, concepts, and definitions have implications for the international HMA community because the DoD
will conduct its HMA activities under this construct and associated legal norms. Specifically, understanding DoD objectives associated with the cooperation and competition below
armed-conflict portions of the continuum will allow others
to assess DoD’s commitment to country-specific HMA programs, and will enable cross-sector organizations to identify
appropriate opportunities and methods for cooperation with
DoD forces.
Similarly, the Army’s MDO concept will affect the HMA
community because MDO includes stability operations and
HMA activities conducted by Army forces.9 Within the MDO
concept, a return to competition provides an example of how
the ideas within the Army’s MDO concept may affect civilian HMA organizations: “In the return to competition [below armed conflict], Army forces conduct three concurrent
tasks: physically secure terrain and populations to produce
sustainable outcomes; set conditions for long-term deterrence

by regenerating partner and Army capacity; and adapt force
posture to the new security environment.”10 To achieve these
results though, military forces must also address armed conflict’s governmental, social, and economic disruptions in addition to the immediate security situation.6 HMA helps DoD
to address these disruptions and to produce sustainable outcomes through land clearance, securing weapons and munitions, and (re)generating partner-military capabilities and
capacities needed for safer living environments.11 This affects civilian HMA organizations because DoD’s HMA activities can influence how the host-nation plans, prioritizes,
and supports military and civilian HMA operations over the
long term. As a result, military and civilian HMA entities may
find themselves more and more intertwined—especially when
military-led efforts transition to “whole of government” stabilization efforts, led by the Department of State (DoS) or by
other civilian agencies.
How well the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power converge across the
competition continuum will factor prominently during
competition below armed conflict, especially during the
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Figure 3. Synthesis of various concepts and definitions of “partnerships” and “collaboration.”
Figure courtesy of author.14

unstable periods immediately following armed conflict. The
Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR)—a joint report by the
U.S. DoD and the U.S. DoS—assessed such convergence in
several, recent post-conflict environments and identified how
convergence may fail. The SAR recommends that the U.S.
Government assign DoS as the lead federal agency for stabilization, with the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the DoD as supporting elements, due “to the lack
of institutionalized DoD mechanisms to enable regular collaboration with interagency and international partners.” However,
as noted in the SAR, the U.S. Government places security restrictions on government civilians. This limits their ability to
deploy to conflict and post-conflict zones.13 The potential inability of DoS and USAID to establish a forward presence in
conflict or post-conflict environments will, presumably, require the DoD to lead the convergence of U.S. Government
capabilities with cross-sector HMA programs as part of the
overall military effort during the early stages of stability operations in post-conflict environments. DoS will continue to be
the lead federal agency for HMA programs and should assume
responsibility once the security situation permits. However, it
will likely have a military “face” in the immediate aftermath of
large-scale, ground-combat operations.
Figure 2 illustrates a linear battlefield common to large-scale,
ground-combat operations (e.g., World War II), with the “close
area” being the front line commonly referred to in Hollywood
movies. The operational and strategic-support areas (i.e., the
rear)—established once the front line has passed through an
area—should be relatively secure and capable of hosting HMA
activities. While typically not engaged in direct combat, these
support areas remain active zones of military activity in which
deep fires (e.g., long-range rockets or ballistic missiles), special
operations forces (SOF), or nonstate actors (e.g., insurgents)
will use explosive hazards to disrupt military sustainment and
stability operations. Furthermore, the political, social, and economic disruption caused by war “create conditions for intense
competition among internal, regional, and global actors seeking
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to retain or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within a
new order.”6 Therefore, the security situation in these (loosely
defined) post-conflict areas may prevent DoS or USAID personnel from assuming lead responsibility for implementing
stabilization activities (including HMA). In these circumstances, the U.S. Army could opt to use a Security Force
Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to partner with other security
forces and use its explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or engineer personnel to provide HMA training to military forces or
local civilians. If so, communication and cooperation between
military forces and civilian HMA organizations would permit
mutually-developed (or informed), military HMA programs
to transfer to civilian authorities and organizations with minimal impact to the communities affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Regrettably, the DoD does not have a doctrinal concept or
idea for a partnership/cooperation continuum to facilitate
this kind of communication and collaboration. However, academics, business consultants, and others have written extensively on cross-sector partnerships and collaboration.
Synthesizing various definitions and models creates a continuum of potential cross-sector, cooperative relationships
(Figure 3). On the left, organizations can limit their cooperation to simply exchanging knowledge and information with
each other to achieve unity of understanding. On the right,
organizations cede organizational autonomy to integrate
as teams with comingled-resources, mutually-determined,
and interdependent goals to achieve unity of command.
Presumably, most NGO-military partnerships will lie toward the left side of the continuum due to many NGOs’ adherence to the four humanitarian principles of humanity,
independence, neutrality, and impartiality. Conversely, U.S.
Government efforts should converge toward unity of command.14 By operating on a partnership/cooperation continuum, disparate organizations can effectively address the
myriad of challenges faced in the competitive gray zone,
without sacrificing their organizational values and missions.

Using a partnership continuum allows military and civilian organizations to identify appropriate circumstances for
communication and cooperation. Returning to the SFAB example, early communication between its EOD forces and the
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. State
Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA)
will establish the unity of effort between U.S. Government
agencies necessary to effectively transfer HMA programs to
civilian authorities once the security situation permits civilians to enter the area. Furthermore, early communication with
HMA NGOs identified by DoS will establish the civil-military
relationships necessary for unity of understanding. When appropriate, NGO input into U.S. Army SFAB-HMA activities
will nudge the relationship toward unity of effort—thereby
enabling a more effective military program with a smoother transition to civil organizations. Once on the ground, civilian organizations must determine to what degree they will
cooperate or collaborate with military or other government
forces, especially when they encounter explosive hazards they
are not trained or equipped to identify, render safe, or dispose
of (e.g., certain types of IEDs or chemical munitions). If they
choose not to train and equip themselves to do tasks typically associated with government forces, then to whom will they
report hazards, and how will they cooperate with military or
other government agencies in the area, if at all? Thinking of
the civil-military HMA relationship as a continuum of options ranging from networking to integrating allows military
and civilian organizations to better compete against explosive
hazards (rather than against each other) in post-conflict (and
other) environments, while simultaneously sustaining their
organizational values and purposes.
In the complex gray zones of post-conflict HMA, more effective operations require better communication and cooperation between military and civilian organizations. Lingering
violence often prevents an immediate civilian presence in
support areas, where combatants’ use of improvised munitions often means civilian HMA organizations are ill-prepared to operate safely. On the other hand, military forces
do not typically have the expertise or experience to address

war’s political, social, and economic disruptions. These realities require ongoing understanding and cooperation between military forces and civilian organizations. To achieve
this, the U.S. DoD should further refine the JCIC, JDN 1-19,
and the U.S. Army’s MDO concept by incorporating an idea
for a range of techniques and processes with which it can
better cooperate with civilian agencies and organizations.
Civilian organizations should review military doctrine and
ideas as well, because they may find the DoD’s gray zone conceptualization useful. From there, they might also contemplate the proposed partnership continuum, so that they can
better prepare themselves to operate just below the level of
armed conflict in the murky gray zone of post-conflict environments and alongside the military forces operating in
them. Collectively, we can achieve better long-term results
using each other’s strengths at the right places and times to
offset our respective weaknesses. After all, the competition in
the gray zone of post-conflict environments is between those
who would use explosive hazards to perpetuate instability
and those who seek to solve war’s political, social, and economic disruptions.
See endnotes page 58
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